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Chapter 12
Lessons from the South-North Migration 
of EU Citizens in Times of Crisis
Jean-Michel Lafleur and Mikolaj Stanek
12.1  Five Lessons from the South-North Migration of EU 
Citizens in Times of Crisis
In this volume, we have demonstrated that—since its inception in 2008—the global 
financial and economic crisis has strongly impacted migration flows to/from/within 
the European Union as well as the way policy-makers and the public have reacted 
to them. While we have noted an intensification of South-North migration flows in 
all the case studies, the political reaction of Northern European receiving countries 
to this increased mobility has often seemed unrelated to the actual size of the phe-
nomenon. Similarly, Southern European countries of origin have also adopted 
diverse responses, ranging from indifference to active engagement towards the ris-
ing level of departure of their citizens.
Over the past few years, the issue of the mobility of EU citizens has become 
increasingly salient and controversial. As demonstrated in this volume, the arrival of 
Southern Europeans has often failed to trigger the same level of animosity in desti-
nation countries as that of post-accession migrants from Central and Eastern Europe. 
Moreover, the renewed influx of asylum seekers to the EU, which intensified expo-
nentially in the summer of 2015, has been seen to precipitate similar high levels of 
hostility. South-North flows of EU citizens, however, pose a series of questions for 
the future of migration in the EU: are we witnessing a repetition of the massive 
South-North migrations that took place two generations ago? Is migration a princi-
pal strategy to cope with the effects of crises within the European Union? How is 
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increasing EU migration shaping the debates and policies in countries of origin and 
destination?
As we bring this volume to a close, we believe that many elements can be found 
in the previous chapters to help provide some answers to these questions. Building 
on our different case studies, we can thus identify five main lessons from the 
renewed migration flows of Southern European EU citizens that are key to our 
understanding of contemporary migration dynamics within the EU. While the 
method that has guided our efforts is not strictly comparative, the comparison of 
elements drawn from carefully selected case studies ensures the validity of those 
conclusions. Similarly, the use of different data sources in the country chapters is 
not an impediment to drawing general conclusions on the characteristics of these 
new migrants. On the contrary, we believe that this diversity of sources has enabled 
us to identify the most salient issues with regard to new Southern European 
migration.
12.1.1  Lesson 1: New Southern EU Migrants Are Different 
from Their Predecessors
The migratory routes that are now leading Southern European migrants to North 
Western European Member States may be similar to those used by guest workers in 
the twentieth century, but the conditions of arrival and the socio-economic charac-
teristics of these new migrants are profoundly different. Post-war migration can be 
seen to have largely occurred in response to recruitment programmes promoted by 
destination countries. In recent times, by contrast, destination countries—except 
Germany—have not explicitly extended an invitation to new migrants, as their own 
economies have also suffered from the effects of the crisis. Whereas Southern 
European guest workers left countries that were barely or partially industrialized 
during most of the twentieth century, the new migrants are leaving their home coun-
tries after several decades of economic growth as EU-15 Member States. 
Unsurprisingly, the different socio-economic contexts in which old and new 
Southern European migration occurred are widely reflected in the socio- demographic 
profiles of citizens leaving during the crisis. As has been shown in Chap. 11, the 
current migrants from Southern Europe are on average better educated compared to 
their post-war predecessors. This is partly related to a general improvement in edu-
cational attainment in these societies as well as to the vulnerable situation of young 
adults in the labour market, who use migration as a coping strategy in times of cri-
sis. However, even though the economic crisis has hit most severely segments of the 
population with low levels of human capital, highly skilled individuals are over- 
represented in the new flows of Southern European migrants because they are the 
ones who are able to better respond to the labour market needs of Northern EU 
Member States. In other words, although it is still unclear how well these new 
migrants are performing in the labour markets, the selectivity of flows according to 
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skills level shows that the transforming structure of demand for labour force in post- 
crisis Northern EU economies may play a crucial role in shaping current South- 
North flows.
Another important factor that determines the profile of current Southern European 
migrants is the decreasing role of networks in migration strategies. This feature 
contrasts clearly with previous waves of South-North migration, when the flows 
were managed on a collective basis within a framework of bilateral agreements. 
Current flows are now more individualized but also more dependent on migrants’ 
skills characteristics and their capacity to adjust to the specific needs of Northern 
EU labour markets.
These trends should not hide the fact that, as shown in the country chapters, cur-
rent South-North migration is far from being homogenous. While statistics on this 
matter are hard to collect, the different country chapters hint at the fact that a share 
of the new Southern European migration has had a previous migration experience. 
Indeed, some new Southern EU migrants are third country migrants who obtained 
citizenship in Southern Europe and either returned to their home country or moved 
North with the economic crisis.
Lastly, transformations between pre and post crisis in migration patterns are not 
uniformly visible in the case of Southern European countries. The case of Portugal 
differs significantly from others due to the larger volume of migration flow com-
pared to its overall population. In addition, migration from Portugal seems to be less 
selective with regard to skills level. Unlike other Southern EU Member States, 
migration from Portugal has never ceased. Although the scarcity of data does not 
allow us to draw categorical conclusions, this fact may explain why the new flows 
of Portuguese emigrants are not so different from the previous ones.
12.1.2  Lesson 2: Migration Is a Strategy Adopted by Citizens 
and States in Response to Crises
As we have clearly shown in this volume, the level of mobility of citizens within the 
EU has significantly increased during the crisis but, overall, only a very small 
minority of EU citizens actually reside in a Member State other than their state of 
nationality, even after the crisis. Considering the harshness of the recession in most 
EU Member States, this data could be viewed as surprising. The case study of 
Greece, for instance, showed that the crisis triggered an increase in migration flows 
but that—in spite of a strong increase in unemployment—flows have remained 
somewhat limited in absolute terms.
Even though migration is a strategy adopted by some in response to the crisis, not 
all sectors of the population in Southern Europe have equal opportunities to emi-
grate. In this volume, we have placed particular emphasis on the process of labour 
market segmentation, which, even before the crisis, had been creating a strong dis-
parity between different groups of workers in terms of protection. Italy and Greece 
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best exemplify this situation. Older workers there tend to hold long-term and stable 
contracts, while young cohorts of workers occupy mostly insecure, highly-flexible 
and low-paid jobs. This segmentation of the labour market in Southern Europe has 
been reinforced with the crisis since contracting and dismissal on the basis of fixed- 
term contracts have become more common.
Throughout this volume, we have thus demonstrated that migration is a strategy 
used by only some EU citizens to deal with the effects of the crisis. Others either do 
not need to take this approach, or make use of alternative strategies that do not entail 
physical mobility. Such strategies have been identified in the various case studies 
featured and they include housing strategies by which young adults return to live in 
the parental home or educational strategies consisting of delaying or suspending 
entry into the job market by resuming tertiary education. Reasons for choosing 
alternatives to migration include the fact that—in Southern Europe as in other parts 
of the world—migration is simply not an option that is available to all citizens who 
find themselves in a situation of vulnerability.
As shown in the case studies here, debates on the skills levels of new Southern 
EU migrants have strongly influenced the reaction of both sending and receiving 
countries to crisis migration. With regard to receiving countries, the case of Germany 
showed that limited skills, issues with the recognition of skills and a low level of 
language proficiency may still discourage would-be emigrants from leaving and 
may hinder the successful socio-economic integration of those who do emigrate. 
Yet, Germany’s reaction also showed that encouraging immigration is a strategy 
followed by states in order to cope with the macro-economic and political effects of 
the crisis. Unlike France, Belgium and the United Kingdom, the German authorities 
clearly saw an opportunity within the crisis to attract highly-skilled workers, who 
are greatly needed in order to maintain the country’s competitiveness. To this end, 
Germany has recruited workers from Southern Europe and provided them with 
training in order to facilitate their integration into the labour market. This strategy 
is, however, only a very partial response to Germany’s labour force needs.
Sending countries, by contrast, have been less eager to promote emigration as a 
solution to unemployment. Unlike other periods in history when Southern European 
governments explicitly encouraged migration as a safety valve, they are now very 
reluctant to even acknowledge the existence of crisis-related migration. The Spanish 
government’s insistence on describing new emigrants as “youngsters in search of 
adventure” is particularly telling in this respect. This attitude illustrates the dilemma 
in which Southern European governments find themselves with regard to crisis- 
related migration. On the one hand, these flows may marginally reduce the pressure 
on social assistance systems and improve unemployment statistics. On the other 
hand, explicitly encouraging emigration could be interpreted as a failure by the 
government to provide an adequate response to the crisis. As shown very clearly in 
the case of Greece, Portugal and Spain, debates on crisis-related emigration have 
often been used by political parties to open up larger debates on austerity and the 
management of the crisis. In other words, emigration data has been instrumental-
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ized by political parties in sending countries to discuss the adequacy of macro- 
economic policy responses in times of crisis.
12.1.3  Lesson 3: The Principle of Freedom of Circulation 
Does Not Apply Equally to All EU Citizens
Freedom of circulation is one of the achievements of the European integration pro-
cess that is most appreciated by EU citizens, in spite of variations in the levels of 
support for this policy across Member States. This right has never been absolute and 
safeguards have always existed to limit the freedom of circulation of undesirable 
EU migrants (e.g. criminals, the unemployed, etc.). With the crisis, Northern 
European Member States have made increasing use of those safeguards and have 
even called for further restrictions upon the freedom of circulation. Those states do 
not, however, uniformly target all EU citizens. Instead, a process of segmentation in 
access to freedom of circulation—which started before the crisis—has been pro-
gressively reinforced with the economic crisis. This segmentation process operates 
along three lines.
First, with regard to occupation, it is important to note that the mobility rights of 
pensioners and students have not at all been questioned in recent years. Also, within 
the category of EU workers, only highly-skilled workers have continued to remain 
desirable in the eyes of governments. As shown with the case of Italian associations 
in Brussels (see Chap. 7), highly-skilled migrants are also those who have access to 
the most resources to mobilize and react when their freedom of circulation is being 
contested. By contrast, posted workers, low-skilled EU workers and mobile unem-
ployed EU citizens have been at the centre of many controversies in Northern 
European Member States. As we have shown in several chapters, these categories of 
migrants have been increasingly depicted as illegitimate EU movers, whose rights 
to circulation should be strongly limited. The most telling example of this discrep-
ancy in the definition of legitimate EU mobility can be seen in the United Kingdom. 
In this country, discourses and policies are becoming increasingly hostile towards 
new EU migrants coming to work in the UK, while the right of retired British citi-
zens to reside in France and in Southern Europe (and to access social services like 
health care in those countries) is not being contested.
Second, Nationality is the second line along which segmentation operates in EU 
citizens’ use of freedom of circulation. Even after the lifting of the temporary 
restrictions on freedom of circulation, the mobility of Central and Eastern European 
EU citizens has usually been more contentious than that of Southern Europeans. 
The sizeable difference in flows provides an explanation for this different percep-
tion. Most importantly however, populist and xenophobic political parties of several 
Member States have used the cliché of the “invasion of Central and Eastern European 
migrants” for over a decade in order to justify their anti-migration stance. The 
“Polish plumber” in France, the “Polish butcher” in Germany or the “Romanian 
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construction worker” in Belgium are the best examples of this rhetorical effort to 
associate perceived negative effects of EU migration with specific nationalities of 
EU citizens.
Southern EU citizens have been affected by restrictive policies applied to all EU 
citizens in times of crisis. These policies undermine their ability to make use of their 
freedom of circulation in Northern Europe. But, in the cases we reviewed, only in 
the United Kingdom did we find explicit negative references made by policy- makers 
towards new Southern Europeans. Underlying this, and this is the third line of seg-
mentation, is the fact that the history of migration has benefited Southern European 
migrants more than those from Central and Eastern European when they moved in 
times of economic crisis. Long-established Southern European migrant communi-
ties did not necessarily generate a higher level of intra-community solidarity 
between old and new migrants. Yet, new Southern European migrant communities, 
such as the Italians in Belgium or the Portuguese in France, have often had a com-
parative advantage when dealing with attacks on their freedom of circulation: they 
are able to benefit from long-established homeland institutions and organizations 
(i.e. political parties, trade unions, immigrant associations, etc.) based in receiving 
countries. Such organizations specialize in defending immigrant rights and have 
built significant connections over the years with other institutions and organizations 
based in destination countries. The mobilization of civil society organizations 
against the removal of residence permits from Southern Europeans living in 
Belgium, who are much less affected by this policy than Central Eastern European 
migrants, is a very telling example of this discrepancy.
12.1.4  Lesson 4: Welfare Is an Instrument for Controlling 
and Delegitimizing EU Migration
Another key lesson of this volume is that social policy, and welfare in particular, are 
increasingly being used by Member States to limit the arrival of the afore- mentioned 
category of “illegitimate EU migrants”. The British and Belgian case studies under-
lined the fear held by Member States of seeing EU migrants abuse their welfare 
systems. In both cases, those fears have led to important policy decisions, whose 
consequences have been to restrict access to welfare for mobile EU citizens. The 
context of crisis, and its associated discourse regarding the need for austerity mea-
sures to bring public expenditure under control, has greatly helped the implementa-
tion of those measures. The crisis has enabled policy-makers to frame a discourse 
on the inability of Member States to respond to the social protection needs of all 
foreigners, and of EU citizens in particular. Restricting the access of mobile EU citi-
zens to social protection does not serve exclusively to reduce welfare spendings. In 
practice, it delegitimizes EU migrants by creating a consistent link between EU 
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migration and “benefit tourism” in spite of the evidence demonstrating that this 
practice is marginal.
In addition to decreasing social protection, we have seen that social policy has 
also become an alternative form of migration policy. As the EU treaties and legisla-
tion leave Member States with little power to limit the freedom of circulation of citi-
zens, controlling EU migrants’ access to welfare has become a new way for states to 
filter undesirable migrants. During the 2015 general election campaign and the 
“Brexit” campaign in the United Kingdom, the centrality of the debate on EU citi-
zens’ access to welfare was very telling of this move towards a management of EU 
migration through welfare. Also, in recent years, Member States have similarly paid 
growing attention to Directive 2004/38/EC on the right to free movement of EU citi-
zens, which allows states to remove the residence permits of EU citizens who rep-
resent an “unreasonable burden on the social system” of their country of residence. 
The Belgium case study showed how radical the change of policy has been in this 
matter following the financial and economic crisis. Having moved on from expel-
ling only a handful of citizens on the basis of the directive in 2007, Belgium has 
subsequently been expelling around 2,500 EU citizens every year since 2012. 
Interestingly, Belgium’s policy sends a clear signal to newcomers and would-be EU 
immigrants to the country: using social protection may serve as a basis for removing 
their residence permit if those migrants are believed to cost more than they contrib-
ute to the Belgian social protection system. While future rulings of the European 
Court of Justice may revoke or set limits on the Belgian policy, this example shows 
how far the implementation of social policies may act as a filter to keep undesirable 
EU migrants out.
12.1.5  Lesson 5: We Need to Talk About Brain Gain and Brain 
Drain Within the EU!
In Europe, migration and development scholars have traditionally been concerned 
with issues of brain drain, but studies have focused mostly on the impact of the 
phenomenon on non-European sending states fearful of losing their highly- educated 
citizens to the benefit of the EU labour market. In the four Southern European coun-
tries studied in this volume, we have, however, noted that policy-makers have 
expressed concerns about a possible South-North internal brain drain being trig-
gered or intensified by the crisis. As shown in this volume, there is some evidence 
of strong participation of highly-skilled workers among the new emigrants, but 
given the limited volume of the outflow, it is still too early to talk about human capi-
tal flight or brain drain.
The fear of losing the best-educated citizens seems to be largely shared in 
Southern Europe, with the possible exception of Spain, where the very idea of 
crisis- related migration has long been repudiated by the Conservative government, 
whilst at the same time being emphasized by opposition parties. Among the expected 
negative outcomes of the current waves of emigration, there is the risk that Southern 
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European countries will find themselves with a lack of a skilled workforce when the 
economic situation improves. This obviously opens up space for debates about the 
legitimacy of high-skilled worker recruitment programmes within the EU, such as 
Germany’s “Job of my Life”. Indeed, even though this programme may offer relief 
to a very limited number of Southern European unemployed citizens (and their gov-
ernments), questions remain regarding the long-term macro-economic effects of 
this loss of work force, whose training was paid for by the sending country’s 
taxpayers.
Beyond espousing discourses, the Portuguese, Spanish and Greek governments 
have done very little to tackle the issue of brain drain. Only the Italian authorities 
seem to have tried hard to address the issue with specific policy measures such as 
tax incentives, pension benefits, access to social housing and seed money pro-
grammes for highly-skilled returnees. In the three other cases, no real policy 
response has been offered to what is described by many within the national political 
arena as an issue of critical importance. Italy’s approach can be explained by a long 
tradition of engagement with its citizens abroad, which has seen the development of 
a very thorough system of representations of emigrants’ interests in the home coun-
try. Such a system, associated with a strong representation abroad of Italian institu-
tions and associations (i.e. political parties and trade unions) has kept the issue of 
emigration and brain drain on the political agenda for over a decade. By contrast, 
Greece has historically had a more ambivalent attitude towards its citizens living 
abroad and has engaged with them to a much lesser extent. It is particularly note-
worthy, for instance, that Greek migrants remain one of the few groups of EU citi-
zens who are deprived of external voting rights in their home country elections 
(Lafleur 2013). Engaging with citizens abroad should, however, be of crucial impor-
tance for sending state authorities in the current socio-economic environment for at 
least two reasons. First and foremost, growing xenophobia and limits on access to 
social protection in destination countries is placing a growing number of their emi-
grants in a position of vulnerability. Accordingly, not only do new Southern EU 
migrants sometimes need assistance, but they also need their home country govern-
ments to enter into a dialogue with Northern European governments when their 
rights are being jeopardized while living abroad. Second, if Southern European 
Member States are serious about involving return migrants in economic recovery 
efforts, a dialogue needs to be opened rapidly with crisis-related emigrants regard-
ing the policies that would facilitate their return to their home country.
12.2  Conclusion: Moving Research and Political Agendas 
Forward
This collaborative book is one of the first attempts to assess comprehensively and 
systematically the main features of crisis-driven South-North EU migration. Even 
though we have explored the impact of this phenomenon on public debates and 
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political agendas in selected sending and receiving countries, several questions still 
require further research efforts and in-depth reflection.
This volume has shown clearly that more systematic and rigorous statistical data 
is needed in order to obtain a more complete and detailed picture of the current 
migratory phenomenon in Europe. Similarly, this book has demonstrated the 
 added- value of conducting focused research with international research teams based 
both in immigrants’ countries of origin and destination.
This book opens the way for explorations of several issues that have not as yet 
been addressed. One of the most important issues is probably the long-term inser-
tion of new Southern European migrants into Northern EU Member States and its 
connections with the large-scale East-West post-accession migration. Throughout 
the book, it has been hypothesized that the patterns of labour market insertion of 
migrants from the new accession countries is one of the factors that explains the 
increasing selectivity in the new flows of South-North migration. However, more 
research is needed to understand the reciprocal influence of these on the type of 
contemporary EU migrations (Kaczmarczyk and Stanek 2015). Examining these 
interactions would not only shed new light on the complex map of current intra-EU 
mobility, it would also help us understand the causal mechanisms that lie behind 
these newer patterns of migration.
In this volume, we have also argued that the full re-establishment of the old 
South-North migratory route depends on a hypothetical continuing divergence in 
economic performance between Northern and Southern EU Member States. If the 
crisis remains strong in the South but eases in the North, rising demand for labour 
may increase Southern European flows. However, the current economic perfor-
mance in the Northern EU Member States under study here revealed that the demand 
for labour is at present insufficient to trigger a complete revival of the post-war 
South-North migratory route.
Future trends of internal mobility within the EU will depend not only on future 
economic performances but also on the evolution of the anti-migration sentiment in 
Northern European societies. As described in this volume, restrictions on migration 
from other EU28 countries are either currently under discussion or have already 
been implemented in several Northern EU Member States. As the growing animos-
ity towards new migrants is being publicized in the Southern European media, 
potential new migrants may be discouraged from making use of their right to circu-
lation. In addition, the large influx of asylum seekers since the Spring of 2015 
and the “Brexit” referendum further demonstrated that immigration is likely to 
remain a topic of contention in the EU in the coming years, even if the economic 
situation improves. The impact of the asylum crisis and of the “Brexit” vote on the 
freedom of circulation of EU citizens is hard to determine at this stage. However, 
this situation indicates that the European Union will be facing the difficult task of 
reflecting simultaneously on its asylum policy and its internal mobility policy in the 
coming years.
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